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Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996; Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, & Martin, 1997) . In a related vein, Isen and her colleagues (Isen & Daubman, 1984 ; see also, Isen, Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992) have also found that happy moods increase the propensity to view unusual exemplars (e.g., "camel") as bona fide members of a given category (e.g., "modes of transportation"), that positive affect increases variety-seeking (i.e., reduces perseverance) among safe, enjoyable alternatives (Kahn & Isen, 1993) and that transient positive moods bolster openmindedness (i.e., reduce defensiveness) in decision making (e.g., Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997; see also, Aspinwall, 1998) . Isen (1987) has accounted for such findings by positing that approach-related (i.e., positive) affective states, such as happiness, engender a "complex cognitive context" that enables concurrent processing of more, and more diverse, material (see also Derryberry and Tucker, 1994; Fredrickson, 2001) .
In light of this prodigious body of findings, the question arises as to whether approach-related states enhance not only cognitive flexibility, but attentional flexibility as well, defined as the ability to adaptably shift focus among cognitive operations using executive control (see e.g., Posner, 1982 , Shallice, 1988 . Following Isen's (1987) reasoning, approach-related states may facilitate attentional shifting because they render a more extensive body of cognitive material accessible, thereby providing a greater number of salient targets (e.g., images, concepts, or plans) upon which to potentially refocus at any given point in time. It is also possible that holding the amount of material in working memory constant, such states may simply diminish attentional perseverance, enabling more rapid shifting between mental contents or procedures (Isen, 2000) .
The results of a recent study by Kuhl and Kazén (1999) provide evidence consistent with this notion. Here, participants were experimentally induced into positive (i.e., approach-related) or negative (i.e., avoidance-related) affective states, then administered a Stroop task. In this well-known task, participants are presented with a series of color words and are asked to indicate the color of the ink in which the words are printed. The words may be printed in ink that is either congruently or incongruently colored (e.g., the word "green," printed in green ink [congruent] or red ink [incongruent] ). When the word is incongruently colored, it elicits a strong tendency to respond with the color word itself as opposed to the color in which it is printed (e.g., to improperly respond with "green" rather than "red" when the word "green" is printed in red ink). The Stroop task may be viewed as assessing attentional flexibility because it requires breaking mental set, and shifting attention toward the goal of naming the color of the word in the face of a concurrent and pervasive tendency to name the word itself. Intriguingly, consistent with the hypothesis that approach-related states bolster the flexibility of attentional selection, Kuhl and Kazén (1999) discovered that Stroop interference was significantly reduced in participants in positive, relative to negative, affective states.
In the present study, we sought to provide convergent evidence for these initial findings suggesting that approach, relative to avoidance motivational states, bolster the flexibility of attention. Moreover, we sought to extend these findings by testing whether the effects of motivational states on attentional flexibility require conscious emotional experience (as manipulated by Kuhl and Kazén, 1999) . Presumably, approach or avoidance motivational states are triggered in the brain by exposure to incentive or threat-related internal or external cues, influencing cognitive processing in a manner that's not directly privy to conscious awareness (see e.g., Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994) . In line with this notion, we hypothesize that the effects of motivational states on attentional flexibility may indeed be produced without mediation by conscious feelings or motives.
To test this hypothesis, we manipulated rudimentary cues associated with approach or avoidance-related emotional states and gauged their influence on two different tasks requiring executive attentional control. In Experiment 1, we manipulated exteroceptive cues by having participants complete paper-and-pencil mazes in which they had to lead a cartoon mouse from the center of the maze to the exit. In the approach cue condition, a piece of cheese was depicted as lying at the exit. Correspondingly, in the avoidance cue condition, a cartoon owl was portrayed as hovering over the maze, poised to capture the mouse if it could not find shelter outside the maze. Completion of the "cheese" maze has been posited to subtly activate an approach state by cuing the mental representation of "seeking reward," whereas completion of the "owl" maze has been posited to activate an avoidance state by cuing the mental representation of "avoiding threat" (Friedman & Förster, 2001 ). Critically, a great deal of evidence suggests that while they do subtly activate approach and avoidance motivational systems, these maze manipulations do not elicit systematic changes in conscious affective experience (Friedman & Förster, 2001) .
In Experiment 2, we manipulated interoceptive (i.e., muscular and proprioceptive) approach and avoidance cues by having participants perform either arm flexion, a motor action used to draw desired objects toward the body, or arm extension, a motor action used to push undesired objects away from the body. A large and growing body of research has suggested that these actions provide bodily stimulation associated with approaching incentives or avoiding threats. For instance, Cacioppo and his colleagues (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Priester, Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996) demonstrated that affectively neutral stimuli (Chinese ideographs) evaluated while performing arm flexion were preferred (i.e., judged as more approach-worthy) to those evaluated while performing arm extension (see also, Friedman & Förster, 2000) . Likewise, Neumann and Strack (2000) found that arm flexion increased the accessibility of positively-valenced words (i.e., approach-related stimuli), whereas arm extension increased the accessibility of negatively-valenced words (i.e., avoidance-related stimuli). In the aforementioned studies, as in countless others (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Förster, 1998; Förster & Strack, 1997 , arm flexion and extension were not found to influence self-reported mood or emotional states; as such, following Neumann and Strack (2000) , we assumed these bodily cues would serve to activate approach or avoidance motivational systems without eliciting conscious affective experience.
In terms of our dependent measures, in Experiment 1, we used a Stroop task to gauge attentional flexibility (cf. Kuhl & Kazén, 1999) . To reiterate succinctly, this task may be construed as assessing attentional flexibility because it requires shifting attention toward word color in the face of a compelling tendency to focus on word meaning.
For the sake of converging operations, in Experiment 2, we employed a 2-back task (see e.g., Cohen et al., 1997; Miyake, Witzki, & Emerson, 2001) . In this task, participants are presented with a series of letters, one at a time, and asked to decide whether each letter is the same as the one that appeared two items earlier. Twoback task performance requires managing allocation of attentional resources to multiple subtasks, including the temporal tagging of sequentially presented letters, the monitoring and updating of information maintained in short-term memory, the organization and elicitation of correct responses, and the inhibition of incorrect responses. Such "multitasking" requires considerable attentional flexibility, inasmuch as undue attentional perseverance upon any given subtask stands to impair overall performance.
In sum, in the present study, we tested the prediction that rudimentary approach, relative to avoidance cues, enhance the flexibility of attention. This prediction was assessed using manipulations of both exteroceptive and interoceptive approach and avoidance cues and employing two distinct measures of attentional flexibility.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method

Participants
Forty-two university undergraduates and high school students from the Bremen (Germany) area, majoring in disciplines other than Psychology were recruited for a study concerning several issues such as perception and concentration. The experiment was conducted at the International University Bremen (IUB). Participants were run individually and received C = 14 for participation.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants completed either the "cheese" maze (approach cue condition), the "owl" maze (avoidance cue condition), or an equivalent maze task depicting neither cheese nor an owl (no cue condition). Following Friedman and Förster's (2001) procedure, the mazes were billed as "achievement tests for children." Participants were given 2 min to solve these simple mazes, which all completed in the allotted time. After completing the mazes, they were administered a four-item survey meant to address alternative mediators for the predicted effect of motivational cues. The items included a measure of expected task performance ("How well do you think will you do on the task?"), on a Likert scale anchored at 1 (very poorly) and 9 (very well), a measure of task liking ("How much do you think you will like the task?"), on a scale anchored at 1 (not at all) and 9 (very much), a measure of task motivation ("How motivated are you right now to perform the task?"), on a scale anchored at 1 (not motivated) and 9 (highly motivated), and a measure of current mood ("How do you feel right now?"), on a scale anchored at 1 (very bad) and 9 (very good).
Afterwards, participants were administered a Stroop task. Specifically, they were presented via computer with 48 color words (12 repetitions of the words "red," "blue," "green," and "yellow"). On half of the trials, the words were compatibly colored (e.g., "red" printed in red) and on the other half were incompatibly colored (e.g., "red" printed in green). On the incompatible trials, each color word appeared in each incompatible color with equal frequency (e.g., "red" appeared equally often in blue, green, and yellow print). Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross "+" in the center of the display for 500 ms, followed by a color word. The arrow keys on the right side of the computer keyboard were fitted with white labels on which the four color words were printed in black ink: the ← key read "yellow," the ↑ key read "red," the ↓ key read "blue," and the → key read "green." Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as possible the color in which each word appeared by pressing the key on the computer keyboard labeled with the appropriate color name. The computer recorded their response time. Each word remained on screen until a response was tendered.
When the entire experimental session was over, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and released. No suspicions regarding the connection between the maze manipulations and the Stroop task were voiced.
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized that approach cues, relative to avoidance cues (or no cue), would increase the flexibility of attention, bolstering Stroop task performance. To test this hypothesis, we computed mean log transformed response times for the incompatible and compatible Stroop trials (see Fazio, 1990) . Two response times (1 in the approach group, 1 in the control group) were excluded for exceeding 2000 ms. Times for erroneous responses on the incompatible trials were also excluded (2 in the avoidance group, 2 in the control group). There were no errors on the compatible trials.
We next computed an ANCOVA on mean response times on incompatible trials, utilizing Cue (approach vs. control vs. avoidance) as a predictor and including mean response times on compatible trials as a covariate. In line with predictions, the analysis revealed a main effect of Cue, F (2, 38) = 12.19, p < .0001, suggesting that approach-cued participants (M = 780.89 ms) were faster to name the incompatible colors than were participants in the control group (M = 880.44 ms), who did not differ from the avoidance-cued participants (M = 982.45 ms). (Planned comparisons between conditions suggested that the approach and control groups reliably differed from one another, t(38) = 2.05, p < .05, whereas there was no significant difference between the avoidance and control groups, t < 1.1). The analysis also revealed a main effect of mean response time on the compatible trials, F (1, 38) = 80.99, p < .0001, reflecting the strong correlation between response time indices, r(39) = .82. To ensure that motivational cues did not generally speed reaction times, we conducted a supplementary ANCOVA using mean response time on the compatible trials (M approach = 710.63 ms; M control = 730.09 ms; M avoidance = 779.15 ms) as a dependent measure and entering mean response time on the incompatible trials as a covariate. There was no significant main effect of Cue, p > .10. In addition, a supplementary 3 (Cue: approach vs. control vs. avoidance) X 2 (Trial: compatible vs. incompatible) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a reliable interaction, F (2, 39) = 4.54, p < .02, suggesting that the effect of Cue on response time differed significantly for the compatible and incompatible trials. Together, these analyses suggest that approach cues only reliably bolster performance on tasks that require increased attentional flexibility and are not simply driven by variance in overall response time.
As a final step in the analysis, in order to rule out the possibility that the effect of motivational cuing on Stroop task performance was mediated by effects of the maze manipulations on expected task performance, task liking, task motivation, or conscious mood, we performed a series of ANOVAs, examining whether Cue reliably influenced any of these auxiliary variables. There were no significant effects (all F s < 2, p s > .14). As a further precaution, we computed supplementary ANCOVAs, separately entering each of our Likert measures of these variables as statistical covariates. In all of these analyses, the effect of Cue remained equally reliable, suggesting that it was not mediated by these measures (these measures were also not reliably influenced by the maze manipulations, all F s < 1). In sum, the findings of the present experiment conceptually replicate those of Kuhl and Kazén (1999) and additionally support the notion that rudimentary approach cues, cues posited to subtly activate underlying approach motivational systems without eliciting conscious (positive) emotional experience, enhance attentional flexibility. In Experiment 2, we attempted to replicate these findings using a different manipulation of motivational cues as well as a distinct dependent measure.
EXPERIMENT 2 Method
Participants
Thirty-six right-handed undergraduate students at the University of MissouriColumbia were recruited for an alleged study on "hemispheric activation." Participants were run individually during sessions that lasted approximately 30 min and received course credit for their participation.
Procedure
In keeping with a procedure developed by Friedman and Förster (2000; 2002) , upon arrival, participants were seated at a table approximately 29 in. in height and told that they would be participating in a study examining the effects of left versus right brain activation on cognitive processing. Participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to the left hemisphere activation condition and that the "standard way" in which this hemisphere is activated is "by having the participant assume a particular right arm position." The experimenter, who was blind to hypothesis, subsequently demonstrated arm flexion (for those assigned to the approach cue condition) or arm extension (for those assigned to the avoidance cue condition). The arm flexion manipulation involved having participants lightly press their left palms upwards against the bottom of a table while keeping their elbows bent at approximately a 90
• angle. The arm extension manipulation involved having participants lightly press their left palms downwards against the countertop while keeping their elbows straight. As alluded to earlier, arm flexor contraction is posited to produce bodily feedback associated with acquiring or consuming desired objects (i.e., bringing them toward the body), whereas arm extensor contraction is posited to give rise to bodily feedback associated with rejecting undesired objects (i.e., pushing them away from the body). After demonstrating the assigned motor action, the experimenter checked that participants knew how to perform it correctly.
Afterward, the experimenter administered the 2-back task (meant to gauge attentional flexibility). In the task, participants were presented via computer with a series of 45 consonants, one at a time. Each consonant remained on screen for 750 ms and was followed by presentation of a blank screen for 1250 ms preceding onset of the next consonant (summing to establish a 2 s stimulus onset asynchrony). Participants were informed that they were to say "yes" aloud whenever a letter was identical to the one they had seen two letters before, and that otherwise they should not say anything. A "yes" response was required for 10 out of the 45 trials on each of two blocks. The first block constituted a practice block meant to acclimate participants to the procedure and to serve as a baseline index of performance. On the second block, participants were asked to engage in the appropriate motor action (flexion vs. extension) before the block began and to withdraw their arms from the table when the block was completed. Performance on the 2-back task was scored and recorded by the experimenter.
After completing the task, participants completed a brief survey on the computer, meant to address alternative potential mediators for the predicted effect. Specifically, they were asked to indicate how distracting the arm contractions were ("How distracting was the arm position?"), how effortful the contractions were ("How effortful was the arm position?"), and how pleasant they were ("How pleasant was the arm position?"), on scales anchored at 1 (Not at all) and 9 (Extremely). Finally, participants were administered an open-ended probe for suspicions regarding the cover story. No hypothesis consistent suspicions were voiced. Participants were then debriefed and released.
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized that approach, relative to avoidance, cues would increase attentional flexibility, as reflected in enhanced 2-back task performance. To assess this hypothesis, we performed an ANCOVA on the number of errors committed by participants on the critical block, utilizing Arm Contraction (flexion vs. extension) as a predictor variable and statistically controlling for errors on the baseline block. As predicted, this analysis revealed a main effect of Arm Contraction, reflecting that approach-cued participants committed significantly fewer errors (M = 0.44) on the critical block than avoidance-cued participants (M = 1.28), F (1, 33) = 4.14, p < .05. In order to rule out the possibility that this effect was due to differences in how distracting, effortful, or pleasant the arm contractions were, we performed a series of t-tests on these auxiliary variables. These analyses revealed only a nonsignificant trend for arm flexion (M = 4.22) to be perceived as more effortful than arm extension (M = 3.11), t(34) = 1.78, p < .09, in line with earlier findings (Friedman & Förster, 2000) . As a further precaution, we additionally computed supplementary ANCOVAs separately entering each of our Likert measures of these auxiliary variables as statistical covariates. In all of these analyses, the effect of Arm Contraction remained equally reliable, suggesting that it was not mediated by these measures. These results suggest that rudimentary approach, relative to avoidance cues enhance the flexibility of attention, enabling more efficient performance of tasks requiring attention to multiple procedures and sources of information.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we tested the hypothesis that rudimentary approach-related, relative to avoidance-related, motivational cues bolster the flexibility of attention. In Experiment 1, participants completed either an approach-themed or an avoidance-themed maze while working on the Stroop task. Performance was superior for approach-cued participants, supporting the notion that approach cues increase the flexibility of attention, in this case, facilitating management of competing response tendencies. The aforementioned findings were conceptually replicated in Experiment 2, which was conducted in a different cultural context using a manipulation of internal as opposed to exteroceptive motivational cues and a different dependent measure. Specifically, we manipulated motivational cues by having participants engage in either flexor contraction (an approach-related motor action) or arm extensor contraction (an avoidance-related motor action). While performing these arm contractions, participants completed a 2-back task, a task requiring a flexible shifting of attention between multiple inputs and processing requirements. As predicted, approach-cued participants committed fewer errors on this task than avoidance-cued participants, again suggesting that approach, relative to avoidance, cues enhance attentional flexibility. All reported effects remained reliable when statistically controlling for between-groups differences in task performance expectancies, task liking, task motivation, and most notably, conscious affective experience. However, inasmuch as these variables were all measured using simple, single-item self-report indices, additional research will undoubtedly be required before any firm conclusions can be drawn regarding their (lack of a) mediational role.
Given these convergent initial findings, the inevitable question arises: What is the specific mechanism driving these and kindred effects of motivational states on attention? One possibility may be derived from the theorizing of Kuhl (2000 Kuhl ( , 1996 , who has proposed a novel means of extending these findings, suggesting that approach-related states may modulate self-regulatory processes associated with supervisory attentional processing, thereby enhancing behavioral flexibility in a very specialized manner. Specifically, according to the "volitional facilitation hypothesis" derived from his theory of personality systems interactions (PSI theory; Kuhl, 2000 Kuhl, , 1996 , Kuhl suggests that in the performance of difficult tasks (i.e., those in which intended actions cannot be implemented until reorganization of the relative activation strengths of competing plans has occurred; Kuhl, 1984) , individuals require intention memory to prevent the premature implementation of active intentions. Intention memory is conceived of as a supervisory attentional function involving, (1) maintenance of a given action intention in short-term storage; and (2) inhibition of the cognitive pathway between the mental representation of this action intention and output representations mediating performance of behaviors related to the intention.
Critically, according to PSI theory, the operation of intention memory during performance of difficult tasks is moderated by positive affect. Specifically, increased positive affect during task engagement acts to release the volitional inhibition of the pathway between action intentions and output representations, thereby freeing the individual to implement explicitly intended behaviors that would otherwise be suppressed. In essence, PSI theory suggests that positive affect is an internal "go" signal, informing the supervisory attentional system that the appropriate moment for initiating an intended response is at hand. This enables mental representations coding for intentions to activate output networks concerned with response implementation, and to do so without constraint. Generally speaking, the end result of this volitional facilitation is increased behavioral flexibility, the ability to perform intended behaviors when they are most optimal, in the absence of undue delays or errors engendered by inhibitory processes.
Returning to the present study, both tasks we administered as dependent measures were difficult tasks presumably requiring intention memory to prevent inappropriate implementation of active intentions. Specifically, the Stroop task (Experiment 1) may be construed as enabling detection of volitional facilitation effects (as stipulated by PSI theory), because it entails the difficult intention of identifying word color in the face of a compelling tendency to respond using word meaning. Likewise, the 2-back task (Experiment 2) presumably makes considerable demands upon intention memory in necessitating that the proper subtask is undertaken in the proper sequence and that the proper response is elicited at the appropriate time. As such, the present findings may be viewed as suggesting that the effects of approach-related affective states on volitional facilitation (as originally demonstrated by Kuhl and Kazén, 1999) may require little or no conscious emotional experience. However, in as much as our measure of conscious emotion was comprised of a simple, single-item self-report index, this conclusion must be seen as provisional at best.
Another possible mechanism for the present effects may be derived from the theorizing of Derryberry and Tucker (1994; see also, Luu, Tucker, & Derryberry, 1998) , who suggest that the effects of approach and avoidance motivational states on attentional processing are hard wired, that is, either congenital and/or genetically preprogrammed to emerge in the course of neural development. Their argument is derived from a neuropsychological theory proffered by Tucker and Williamson (1984) , which posits the existence of two distinct arousal systems in the brain that form the basis of motivational states, primitively regulating avoidance of threats and pursuit of incentives. Tucker and Williamson's (1984) tonic activation system is proposed to function in maintaining vigilance under threat. When threat cues are detected, consciously or unconsciously, the system is posited to automatically generate a redundancy bias, focusing attention such that initially accessible cognitive material is maintained in working memory over time whereas other material is barred access. Restated, the tonic activation system automatically constricts the scope of attention, resulting in perseverance or rigidity in the face of threat. In contrast, Tucker and Williamson's (1984) phasic arousal system is proposed to function in incentive seeking. In the face of incentive cues, the system is posited to automatically generate a habituation bias, expanding the scope of attention and enabling it to flexibly encompass novel as well as initially accessible cognitive material.
Although the details are well beyond the scope of the current discussion, Tucker and Williamson (1984) propose that the tonic activation system intensifies left hemispheric contributions to cognitive processing whereas the phasic arousal system intensifies right hemispheric contributions. They suggest that the effects of motivational states on attention may be understood as involving differential allocation of processing demands by these hard wired tonic and phasic arousal systems to the left versus right hemispheres. By extension, rudimentary approach and avoidance cues, such as arm flexion and extension, should influence attentional flexibility by automatically activating these differentially lateralized approach and avoidance motivational systems, which thereby "tune" the scope of attention, enhancing or diminishing the ability to shift focus. At present, we are assessing this possibility by empirically examining whether internal and external approach cues differentially activate the right hemisphere whereas internal and external avoidance cues differentially activate the left hemisphere, and whether the influence of motivational cues on attentional flexibility is mediated by these differential patterns of hemispheric activation (see Friedman & Förster, 2005) .
In conclusion, the studies reported at present pose more questions than they can possibly answer. Additional research, using different manipulations and measures, is clearly needed to bolster our hypothesis and to elucidate the functional and neuropsychological underpinnings of the phenomena at issue. We hope this line of work will ultimately help advance the view, enunciated by a growing number of theorists (e.g., Isen, 2000; Fredrickson, 2001; Aspinwall, 1998; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994) , that approach-related motivational states enhance the flexibility of human behavior.
